The aim of this study is to show that, when examining social identi®cation, it is both possible and important to distinguish between self-categorisation, commitment to the group, and group self-esteem, as related but separate aspects of group members' social identity. This was demonstrated in an experiment (N 119), in which Ingroup Status (high/low), Ingroup Size (majority/minority), and Group Formation (self-selected/ assigned group membership) were manipulated orthogonally. The results of this study con®rm that these three aspects of social identity can be distinguished as separate factors in a principal components analysis. Furthermore, as predicted, the three aspects are dierentially related to manipulated group features, as well as displays of ingroup favouritism. Group members' self-categorisations were only aected by the relative size of the group, while group self-esteem was only in¯uenced by group status. Aective commitment to the group depended both on group status and on the group assignment criterion. Importantly, only the group commitment aspect of social identity mediated displays of ingroup favouritism. Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
with the group in question (aective commitment).
1 Indeed, there is recent empirical evidence that people who belong to the same social group may show dierential responses, depending on the extent to which they feel aectively committed to that group (cf. Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; . Accordingly, it has also been demonstrated that self-stereotyping (denoting a cognitive awareness of one's group membership) can be distinguished from aective commitment to the group (see at the measurement level, in the sense that they emerged as two separate clusters of items in a principal components analysis.
A second respect in which we would like to specify our conceptualisation of ingroup identi®cation is by distinguishing the extent to which people feel emotionally involved with their group (aective commitment) from the value connotation of that particular group membership (group self-esteem). It has repeatedly been argued (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and demonstrated (cf, Ellemers, 1993 ) that the two often covary, in the sense that aective commitment tends to be stronger in more positively evaluated groups (because these groups may contribute more to a positive social identity), while people are inclined to distance themselves from less attractive groups. However, and again this can be seen most clearly in the case of natural groups (when leaving the group does not constitute an easy or attractive option), this does not imply that the two necessarily go together, or that these concepts can be used interchangeably. Indeed, recent empirical evidence clearly reveals that, provided their identity as members of a distinct social group is suciently important, people may show signs of strong emotional involvement while simultaneously acknowledging or even emphasizing the negative characteristics of their group (see Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996) .
In terms of our conceptual analysis, this implies that self-categorisation (the cognitive component) as well as aective commitment to a speci®c group (the emotional component) can be distinguished from group self-esteem derived from the value connotation of that particular group membership (the evaluative component). More importantly, we want to argue that this distinction should be made, to be able to understand how they are aected dierentially by speci®c characteristics of the group or the social context. Indeed, on the basis of previous theory and research it is possible to hypothesize which group characteristics are most likely to aect the three dierent components of identi®cation. Furthermore, we predict that these components are dierentially related to displays of ingroup favouritism in evaluative responses or outcome allocations.
Relative status can be considered a central group characteristic in both theory and research on social identity and intergroup relations. The general argument is that a low group status position results in unfavourable comparisons between the ingroup and relevant other groups, which may frustrate attempts to derive a positive social identity from one's group membership. As a result, members of lower status groups are expected to show less social identi®cation than members of groups with higher status. Indeed, empirical investigations have con®rmed that ingroup identi®cation is generally less in lower status groups than in groups with high status (Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, De Vries, & Wilke, 1988; Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987) . However, in line with our previous analysis, we want to argue that it is mainly the evaluative component of social identity (group selfesteem), that is aected by relative group status. If this were indeed the case, this would also help us understand inconsistent empirical ®ndings with respect to the socalled self-esteem hypothesis in social identity theory (see Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Long & Spears, 1997) . Essentially, the contradictory issue seems to be that, on the one hand, members of lower-status groups are expected to show ingroup favouritism as a means to boost their social identity. On the other hand, to the extent that the current low status of their group results in low ingroup identi®-cation, this should preclude them from undertaking such group-level behaviour. However, if we assume that low group status negatively aects the evaluative component of identi®cation only, while the level of aective commitment (the emotional component) can remain unchanged, it becomes clear that it is the combination of a threat to group self-esteem and strong aective commitment which should elicit attempts to depict the ingroup in a positive way.
A second important issue which has generated a substantial amount of empirical research concerns the eects of relative group size on ingroup identi®cation and ingroup favouritism (e.g. Gerard & Hoyt, 1974; Mummendey & Simon, 1989; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984; Simon & Brown, 1987) . Again, to date, the precise nature of these eects has not been established unambiguously. We have argued elsewhere that (seemingly) inconsistent results may have been obtained in previous research because minority versus majority group membership has often been used to refer to dierential status as well as dierential group size (see . However, when the two are disentangled, it turns out that minority group size results in stronger ingroup identi®cation than majority group size. Other than group status eects, it seems that this is not due to the fact that membership in a minority group is more attractive but because it is more salient or distinctive than majority group membership (see McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978; McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976 ). Simon and Hamilton (1994) indicate that membership in a small or distinctive group implies a relatively large overlap between the collective self and the individual self. In a similar vein, from an optimal distinctiveness perspective (see Brewer, 1991) it would seem that, compared to inclusion in a majority group, minority group membership oers a better opportunity to balance the need to retain some sense of individuality with the need to belong to a group, which should result in a greater readiness to perceive or de®ne oneself as a group member. Accordingly, we would argue that it is mainly the cognitive component or self-categorisation aspect of ingroup identi®cation that is aected by relative ingroup size.
Finally, we aim to identify group characteristics which primarily in¯uence the emotional component of ingroup identi®cation, that is, the extent to which people feel aectively committed to a particular group. In our view, this component is essential as this is supposed to constitute the main determinant of individual-level (such as distancing oneself from the group) versus group-level responses (e.g. displays of ingroup favouritism) to a common identity threat (see also . In relation to this issue, we argue that a fundamental distinction can be made between assigned versus achieved (or self-selected) group memberships. Although this distinction has been noted in the literature (e.g. Luhtanen & Crocker, 1991) , neither in theoretical accounts nor in empirical work has systematic attention been devoted to possible dierential responses to membership in these two kinds of 374 N. Ellemers et al.
groups. Nevertheless, from the original formulations of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) as well as from previous empirical work we may infer that the nature of one's group membership is likely to make a dierence. In laboratory research (Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993) it has been established that individuals who feel that their inclusion in a lower-status group is unjust (but are nevertheless assigned to this group by the experimenter) are likely to compete with their fellow ingroup members in order to leave this group, indicating relatively little group commitment. In contrast, to the extent that people have voluntarily committed themselves to membership in a particular group, they are more inclined to show group solidarity, even when the group turns out to be unsuccessful (see Turner, Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1984) . In a similar vein, Cio and Garner (1996) have demonstrated that people who have actively applied for membership in a particular group are most likely to behave in accordance with their group membership. Indeed, the observation that systematically dierent results are obtained with research among natural versus arti®cial groups (see Mullen et al., 1992) , may have to be attributed to the fact that arti®cial groups are usually created by assigning people to a particular experimental group, while a classi®cation of research participants into natural groups (e.g. according to their study major, university town, or political aliation) is generally more likely to involve self-selected group memberships. Accordingly, recent empirical evidence has demonstrated that dierent results obtained with these two kinds of research paradigms can at least to some extent be ascribed to the fact that the level of ingroup identi®cation tends to be higher as a result of natural compared to arti®cially created group memberships (Jetten et al., 1996) .
We want to argue that this dierential group commitment essentially occurs because of the basis on which people are included in a particular group (i.e. assigned versus self-selected group memberships). Although in practice this distinction may covary with the distinction between arti®cial and natural groups as we have argued above, in our view this points to an empirical confound, rather than to a conceptually necessary or inherent combination of features of these two kinds of groups. Indeed, membership in some natural groups (such as gender groups or ethnic groups) is assigned, rather than self-selected, while arti®cial groups for laboratory investigations can also be created by letting participants choose or earn membership in a particular group (cf. Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990) . In this study we will therefore systematically vary the way in which participants are included in one of two arti®cially created groups by either having the experimenter decide (assigned group membership) or letting people indicate themselves to which of two groups they think they belong (self-selected group membership).
To summarise the above argument, it seems both necessary and informative to distinguish between dierent components of social identity as possible responses to group membership and group features. The ®rst aim of this study therefore is to demonstrate that this is not only a possible conceptual distinction but that it can also be made empirically. For this purpose, we will investigate how the three aspects of social identity are dierentially aected by important group features, notably the relative status and size of the group, and the basis of group formation (i.e. assigned or self-selected group membership). Furthermore, we aim to assess whether the three components of social identity play a dierent role as mediators of grouplevel behaviour. Speci®cally, we predict that it is essentially a sense of emotional involvement with the group (aective commitment), rather than the cognitive Self-categorisation 375 (self-categorisation) or evaluative (group self-esteem) component of ingroup identi®-cation which predisposes people to show ingroup favouritism. In order to investigate this, we manipulated the group assignment criterion (self-selected versus assigned group membership), the relative size (minority versus majority) and status (high versus low) of arti®cially created groups. In addition to measuring the three components of social identity, we also included separate measures of personal selfesteem and personal identity (a personal-level equivalent of commitment to the group seems irrelevant), to investigate under what circumstances these measures at the personal level show opposite or parallel results to the group-level measures (Turner, 1985) .
METHOD Participants
One hundred and nineteen students of the Free University in Amsterdam (51 men and 68 women) participated on a voluntary basis in this study. Their mean age was 22 (ranging from 18 to 59). In each session of the experiment, eight students participated. They were randomly allocated to one of the experimental conditions, with equal proportions of male and female participants in each cell of the experimental design. Each session of the experiment lasted about one hour. At the end of each session, participants were fully debriefed and asked not to discuss the experiment with fellow students. They were thanked for their participation, and received book tokens for the amount of H¯.10,-per person.
Procedure

Cover Story
Upon arrival, participants were placed in separate cubicles, and equipped with personal computers, which were allegedly connected with each other. Instructions about the experiment, and questions were displayed on the computer screen; participants could respond by using the keyboard and mouse. First, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire, in order to get acquainted with the computer equipment (e.g.`I usually see more than one possible solution for problems I am faced with; I sometimes have diculty seeing things from a broad perspective'). As a cover story, it was subsequently explained that the experiment would investigate people with dierent styles of problem solving, and more speci®cally, that inductive thinkers would be compared to deductive thinkers (see Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995) . It was further explained that, at the individual level, both styles of problem solving seemed equally eective. The alleged purpose of the present investigation would be to ®nd out whether groups of inductive or deductive thinkers would dier with respect to their pro®ciency in problem solving. Therefore, it was necessary to subdivide the participants into two groups, according to their individual problemsolving style. 376 N. Ellemers et al.
Manipulation of Group Formation
In the assigned group condition, it was stated that the questionnaire participants had completed at the outset of the experiment actually had measured their problemsolving style. After providing participants with some further information about the two styles of problem solving, they were allegedly subdivided into two groups, on the basis of their problem-solving style. The label of the group in which participants were placed (inductive or deductive) was counterbalanced. In the self-selected group condition, participants also received further information about the two styles of problem solving. However, in this condition, subjects could indicate for themselves which style best described their own way of thinking. Accordingly, their membership in the group of inductive thinkers or deductive thinkers was self-selected.
2
Manipulation of Ingroup Size
Half of the participants were led to believe that their group was a majority group, half supposedly ended up in a minority group. In the majority condition, the ingroup allegedly consisted of ®ve (of eight present) participants. Additionally it was stated that the ingroup problem-solving style was generally found in 70% of the population. In the minority condition, the ingroup was said to consist of three participants; in this condition the ingroup problem-solving style was allegedly shared by 30 per cent of the population.
Manipulation of Ingroup Status
After the two groups had been formed, participants were asked to complete a group task consisting of 15 items, in order to ®nd out which of the two groups was more pro®cient at problem solving. For each item of this group task, participants were presented with a series of four items (e.g. vacuum cleaner, mop, broom, dustpan), and asked to indicate which item did not belong in the set. Then, participants were allegedly shown the initial answers given by other members of their group (in fact, these answers and the level of disagreement within the group were pre-programmed and standardised for all participants). On the basis of this information, participants could give their ®nal answer; they were not informed about the ®nal answers of their fellow group members. After they had completed all 15 items in this way, participants received (pre-programmed) feedback about the performance of the two groups. In the high-status condition, the ingroup received a score of 82 points; the other group received 53 points. Additionally, participants were informed that the norm for university students was 67 points. In the low-status condition, these scores were reversed: the ingroup received 53 points and the outgroup 82 points; the norm score was the same. Care was taken to assure participants that these scores had been corrected for the number of group members: each group could gain a maximum of 100 points, regardless of the size of the group. Thus, it was explained that there was no a priori advantage or disadvantage for the majority group or the minority group.
Checks on the Manipulations
After participants had received all the information regarding the manipulations, and before they answered the dependent measures, three questions were asked to check whether they had understood the manipulations in the intended way. Participants were asked whether they were part of the group of inductive or deductive thinkers, whether their group was a minority or a majority group, and whether their group's performance on the group task was superior or inferior to the performance of the other group. Two participants did not indicate their group membership correctly; they were not included in further analyses.
Dependent Variables
In this study, we intended to measure self-categorisation, commitment to the group, and group self-esteem aspects of`social identity', with 15 questions (e.g.`I identify with other members of my group'). We further asked ten questions (see Table 2 ) to form analogous measures at the individual level for personal identity and personal selfesteem (a personal level equivalent of commitment to the group seems irrelevant). These measures were partly selected and adapted on the basis of existing measures (e.g. Brown, et al., 1986; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Ellemers, 1993; Rosenberg, 1965) , and partly designed for the present study. All questions were answered on 7-point scales, with 1 indicating`not at all' and 7`very much'. Additionally, participants rated both groups on eight bipolar scales, four of which were related to the status de®ning dimension (e.g. unintelligent±intelligent), and four were alternative dimensions (e.g. dishonest±honest). These two sets of dimensions were included to oer participants in both group status conditions the opportunity to display ingroup favouritism without violating consensual de®nitions of social reality (see Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995; Ellemers, Van Rijswijk, Roefs, & Simons, 1997) . Finally participants were asked to independently allocate points to each group, that is, they could allocate zero to 100 points to their own group, and zero to 100 points to the other group.
RESULTS
Group Self-esteem, Self-categorisation, and Commitment to the Group
One of the main purposes of the present investigation was to see whether we could distinguish between group self-esteem, self-categorisation and commitment to the 378 N. Ellemers et al.
group as three dimensions of social identity. Therefore, the 15 social identity items were subjected to principal components analysis. Initial results revealed three interpretable factors de®ned by ten items, while ®ve items either loaded on more than one factor, or did not load on any of these three factors. Therefore, only ten items were retained for the ®nal analyses. This revealed three factors with an Eigenvalue greater than 1, which together account for 65 per cent of the variance in the separate questions. The loadings of the separate questions on these three factors (after varimax rotation), clearly indicate that three subsets of questions constitute three dierent components (see Table 1 ). The ®rst factor is de®ned by four items re¯ecting the evaluative consequences of group membership. Therefore, we will refer to this component as`group self-esteem'. The second factor comprises three questions referring to the inclusion of the self in the group, or self-de®nition as a group member. Hence, this component will be termed self-categorisation'. The three questions with the highest loadings on the third factor are related to group members' desire to continue acting as a group member and are therefore referred to as`commitment to the group'. In sum, this principal components analysis con®rms that we may distinguish between evaluative, cognitive, and aective aspects of social identity, namely group self-esteem, self-categorisation, and commitment to the group.
When we combine all social identity questions into one unweighted mean score (alpha 0.82), a 2 (Ingroup Status) Â 2 (Ingroup Size) Â 2 (Group Formation) analysis of variance reveals main eects of all three factors (Ingroup Status: F(1,111) 21.52, p 5 0.001, Ingroup Size: F(1,111) 4.92, p 5 0.05, and Group Formation: (F(1,111) 4.30, p 5 0.05). The relevant means indicate that overall social identity was higher in the High Status condition (M 5.15) than in the Low Status condition (M 4.44), it was higher in the Minority condition (M 5.01) than in the Majority condition (M 4.61), and it was higher when the group is Self-selected (M 4.99) than when group membership is Assigned (M 4.68). Additionally, there was a marginally signi®cant interaction of Ingroup Size and Group Formation (F(1,111) 3.79, p 5 0.054), which quali®es the latter two main eects. The relevant Self-categorisation 379 means indicate that social identity was lower for participants who were Assigned to the Majority group (M 4.36), than participants for whom the Majority group was Selfselected (M 4.97), or participants in the Minority conditions (M 5.01 in both Group Formation conditions). However, as we have argued in the introduction, the main reason to distinguish between these three aspects of social identity is that they are expected to be dierentially aected by speci®c group characteristics, and that a further speci®cation of these eects may help us understand seemingly inconsistent ®ndings that are reported in the literature. In order to investigate whether the predicted relations can indeed be established, we included the three orthogonal (standardised) factor scores in a 2 (Ingroup Status) Â 2 (Ingroup Size) Â 2 (Group Formation) MANOVA.
3 As was the case with the overall mean score, this revealed multivariate signi®cant main eects of Ingroup Status (F(3,109) 8.60, p 5 0.001), of Ingroup Size (F(3,109) 2.99, p 5 0.05), and Group Formation (F(3,109) 4.59, p 5 0.01). However, when we look at the univariate eects of the three factors, the picture becomes more dierentiated. It turns out that the eect of Ingroup Status was only signi®cant for the group self-esteem factor (F(1,111) 5.74, p 5 0.05), and the commitment factor (F(1,111) 16.09, p 5 0.001). As predicted, group self-esteem was higher in the High Status condition (M 0.21) than in the Low Status condition (M À0.23). Furthermore, group members felt more strongly committed to the High Status group (M 0.34) than to the Low Status group (M À0.37). In contrast, the Ingroup Size eect was only signi®cant for the self-categorisation factor (F(1,111) 8.58, p 5 0.01). In line with our theoretical argument, participants self-categorised stronger as members of a Minority group (M 0.27) than as members of a Majority group (M À0.27). Finally, at the univariate level the Group Formation eect was only signi®cant for the commitment factor (F(1,111) 11.45, p 5 0.001), supporting our prediction that participants would feel more committed to a Self-selected group (M 0.33), than to an Assigned group (M À0.24). This main eect was quali®ed by a marginally signi®cant interaction of Group Formation with Ingroup Size (F(1,111) 2.94, p 5 0.09), indicating that the Group Formation eect was more pronounced in the Majority condition (M(Self-selected) 0.43; M(Assigned) À0.42) than in the Minority Condition (M(Self-selected) 0.22; M(Assigned) À0.05).
Personal Identity and Personal Self-esteem
The ten questions intended to measure personal self-esteem and personal identity were ®rst subjected to a principal components analysis to investigate whether the intended self-esteem and identity components could also be distinguished at the personal level. This resulted in a two-factorial solution, which accounts for 62% of the variance in the separate items. Furthermore, as the loadings on the two factors indicate, the varimax rotated factor solution revealed the intended subdivision into items related to self-esteem and items related to personal identi®cation (see Table 2 ). The ®rst factor is clearly de®ned by seven questions tapping the evaluative aspect of people's self-image, and is therefore termed`personal self-esteem'. The second factor comprises three questions focusing on the self-de®nition as a unique individual, and is hence referred to as`personal identi®cation'. As we did at the group level, we subjected the resulting factor scores to a 2 (Ingroup Status) Â 2 (Ingroup Size) Â 2 (Group Formation) MANOVA. This revealed a multivariate eect of Ingroup Size (F(2,110) 2.56, p 5 0.08), which was signi®cant at the univariate level for the personal identi®cation factor (F(1,111) 4.44, p 5 0.05). The relevant means indicate that participants showed stronger personal identi®cation in the Minority condition (M 0.20) than when they belonged to a Majority group (M À0.19). Furthermore, there was a multivariate interaction of Ingroup Status and Group Formation (F(2,110) 2.47, p 5 0.09), as well as a multivariate interaction of Ingroup Size, Ingroup Status and Group Formation (F(2,110) 3.54, p 5 0.05). At the univariate level both these eects were only signi®cant for the personal self-esteem factor (F(1,111) 4.51, p 5 0.04 and F(1,111) 6.67, p 5 0.02, respectively). When we look at the relevant means (see Table 3 ), it turns out that the group formation criterion did not aect personal self-esteem for members of high status groups. With low ingroup status, participants for whom membership in this group was self-selected showed lower personal self esteem than participants who were assigned to the group. This eect is quali®ed by the three-way interaction, which reveals that the interaction 
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between ingroup status and group formation was only signi®cant in majority (F(1,111) 10.99, p 5 0.001) but not in minority groups (F(1,111) 5 1, ns) . Thus, the dierence in self-esteem ratings between self-selected and assigned members of low status groups was caused by the majority condition, which implies that participants' personal self-esteem was lowest when their membership in a low-status majority group was self-selected, instead of assigned.
Group Ratings
The group ratings on eight evaluative dimensions were ®rst combined into unweighted mean scores for the ingroup (alpha 0.82) and the outgroup (alpha 0.83). Then a dierentiation score was calculated, by subtracting the average outgroup rating from the ingroup rating. This evaluative dierentiation score was subjected to a 2 (Ingroup Status) Â 2 (Ingroup Size) Â 2 (Group Formation) analysis of variance. This ®rst revealed that the overall mean dierentiation deviates signi®cantly from zero (F(1,111) 15.26, p 5 0.001), indicating that group members generally favoured the ingroup over the outgroup (M 0.29). However, the Ingroup Status main eect (F(1,111) 13.72, p 5 0.001), indicates that ingroup favouritism was only displayed by members of the High Status (M 0.57) rather than the Low Status (M À0.02) Ingroup. 4 Additionally, a two-way interaction of Ingroup Size and Group Formation (F(1,111) 4.94, p 5 0.05) emerged. Inspection of the relevant means (see Table 4 ) and analysis of simple main eects reveals that the overall tendency to display ingroup favouritism in evaluative ratings did not emerge among participants who were assigned to a majority ingroup. Speci®cally, these group members were less inclined to show ingroup favouring evaluations than participants for whom majority group membership was self-selected (F(1,111) 7.23, p 5 0.01), or participants who were assigned to a minority group (F(1,111) 4.10, p 5 0.05). 
Outcome Allocation
We calculated an outcome dierentiation measure, by subtracting the number of points allocated to the ingroup (0±100) from the points (0±100) allocated to the outgroup, and subjected this measure to a 2 (Ingroup Status) Â 2 (Ingroup Size) Â 2 (Group Formation) analysis of variance. The signi®cant deviation of the overall mean score from zero (F(1,111) 5.88, p 5 0.05), indicates that participants were generally inclined to favour their ingroup in outcome allocations (M 2.87). Additionally, an Ingroup Status main eect emerged (F(1,111) 62.61, p 5 0.001), indicating that High Status group members favoured the ingroup (M 11.03), while Low Status group members tended to acknowledge the status dierence in their outcome allocations, by favouring the outgroup (M À6.02).
Ingroup Favouritism and Identi®cation
In order to investigate the relation between identi®cation and ingroup favouritism, we ®rst conducted correlational analyses. As can be seen in Table 5 , dierentiation in evaluative ratings as well as outcome allocations is signi®cantly correlated with social identi®cation, and is not related to personal identi®cation or personal self-esteem (the dierent components of social identity also were unrelated to personal identi®cation or personal self-esteem, with non-signi®cant correlations ranging from À0.20 to 0.20). This is in line with general predictions from social identity theory, as well as previous empirical ®ndings. However, when we take a closer look at the three dierent components of social identity, it turns out that self-categorisation (the cognitive component) does not contribute to either form of dierentiation. Group self-esteem (the evaluative component) shows a moderate relation with the two intergroup dierentiation measures, and as predicted only aective commitment (the emotional component) is reliably correlated with displays of ingroup favouritism on both measures. We further investigated the relation between social identi®cation and ingroup favouritism by performing mediational analyses. Speci®cally, we explored whether the three components of social identi®cation would dierentially emerge as predictors of ingroup favouritism, and investigated whether inclusion of these covariates might (partly) account for eects of the independent variables on displays of ingroup favouritism. The analysis of covariance for the evaluative dierentiation measure revealed a signi®cant eect of the regression (F(3,108) 3.41, p 5 0.05). Of the three In a similar vein, we assessed the mediating eects of the three social identity components on outcome dierentiation. Again, the regression was signi®cant in the analysis of covariance (F(3,108) 3.34, p 5 0.05), and group commitment was the only signi®cant predictor of ingroup favouritism in outcome allocations (beta 0.27, t 2.87, p 5 0.01), while group self-esteem (beta 0.14, t 1.52, ns) and selfcategorisation (beta 0.06 t 5 1, ns) did not emerge as signi®cant covariates. As was the case with evaluative dierentiation, the main eect of Ingroup Status that emerged in the analysis of variance (F(1,111) 62.61, p 5 0.001) was substantially reduced in the analysis of covariance (F(1,108) 35.60, p 5 0.001).
5 Again, this indicates that only the group commitment component of social identity mediates intergroup dierentiation in outcome allocation.
DISCUSSION
The primary aim of this study was to investigate whether the theoretical distinction between three dierent components of social identity may help us understand why speci®c group characteristics aect reported levels of social identi®cation. Furthermore, we wanted to establish the role each of the three aspects plays as a cause for people to behave in terms of their group membership (i.e. to display ingroup favouritism). As we have demonstrated, the`traditional' consideration of the three components as related aspects of a single theoretical construct (which indeed seems acceptable in terms of the internal consistency of the overall scale) appears to indicate that relative ingroup size, relative ingroup status, and the group formation criterion all aect the extent to which people identify as a member of their group, which is consistent with previous research. However, in our view, why this is the case can only be understood when we disentangle the three components that are contained in the most commonly used de®nition of social identity (Tajfel, 1978) .
As predicted, group self-esteem (that is, the evaluative aspect of social identity) is only aected by the relative status of the ingroup, while the extent to which people selfcategorize as group members (the cognitive aspect) solely depends on the relative size of the ingroup. Furthermore, it turns out that minority group members simultaneously report strong self-categorisation as group members and strong personal identi®cation. This is in line with Brewer's (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory as well as Simon's analysis (Simon & Brown, 1987; Simon & Hamilton, 1994) , who both argue that social and personal identities can be more easily reconciled in minority rather than majority groups. For our present argument it is important to note that relative ingroup size only aects self-categorisation, but not group self-esteem. This may help us understand why strong group identi®cation can be observed among minority group members, even if this may seem unfavourable in terms of the value connotation of their group membership (see also . In a more general sense, this corroborates our argument that the two components are relatively independent of each other, which implies that a threat to group self-esteem does not necessarily lead people to avoid self-categorisation in terms of that particular group membership, or vice versa.
Aective commitment to the group (the emotional aspect of social identi®cation) turns out to depend both on the way groups have been formed and on the relative status of these groups. Thus, group commitment is enhanced when people have selfselected their group membership, or when the group turns out to have relatively high status. It is important to note that these two main eects occur independently of each other. This implies that even when a particular group has low status, people may show relatively strong group commitment when their membership in this group was selfselected rather than externally imposed (cf. Turner et al., 1984) . Furthermore, it turned out that the reluctance to feel emotionally involved with an assigned group membership is exacerbated when the group in question constitutes a majority, which does not oer the opportunity to distinguish oneself as a distinct individual, as we have argued above. Indeed, an externally imposed membership in a majority group not only resulted in the lowest level of group commitment but also led people to refrain from showing ingroup favouritism in evaluative group ratings. Thus, it seems that the independent eects of dierent group characteristics may reinforce each other when combined, which is also evident from our observation that personal self-esteem is lowest for those who have self-selected their membership in a low status majority group.
In our theoretical analysis we argued, in line with social identity theory, that group commitment is the main aspect of social identity that aects people's tendency to behave in terms of their group membership. Indeed, we referred to the inconsistent ®ndings with respect to the relation between group status and ingroup favouritism, to argue that while low group status may reliably threaten group self-esteem, the display of ingroup favouritism (i.e. showing a group-level response to such threat) depends on the extent to which people feel committed to the group. When we look at the results we obtained with respect to ingroup favouritism, it turns out that people are most inclined to favour the ingroup (both in terms of evaluative ratings and outcome allocations) when it has relatively high status. In contrast, members of lower status groups tend to acknowledge this state of aairs in their group ratings and outcome allocations. A similar pattern of results has been observed in previous studies (e.g. Blanz et al., 1995; , where it was explained by arguing that consensual de®nitions of social reality may restrict the extent to which lower-status group members feel free to claim ingroup superiority on evaluative dimensions or feel justi®ed to favour their group in outcome allocations. In fact, such reality constraints have been cited as one possible reason why lower status group members may refrain from showing ingroup favouritism (Hinkle & Brown, 1990) , while they may nevertheless be motivated to perceive (and depict) their group in a positive way.
More relevant to our present argument, however, is the way in which these displays of ingroup favouritism are related to the three components of social identity. First, it is important to note that ingroup favouritism can indeed be considered a group-level response to the social situation, in the sense that (contrary to what is suggested by Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987) ingroup favouritism is only related to people's social identity, and not to their personal identity or personal self-esteem. Furthermore, when we dierentiate between the three components of social identity, analyses of covariance corroborate our theoretical prediction. It turns out that only the group commitment aspect of social identity reliably mediates displays of ingroup favouritism on evaluative and allocation measures. As we have argued in the introduction, this may help us understand the seemingly contradictory ®nding that low group status may result in decreased social identi®cation on the one hand, but in increased ingroup favouritism on the other hand. The results of the present investigation enable us to specify that although low group status may negatively aect both group self-esteem as well as group commitment (i.e. the evaluative and the emotional components of social identity), other independent group characteristics (such as the group formation criterion) may in turn reinforce a sense of aective involvement with one's group (the emotional component). Importantly, only the group commitment aspect of social identity mediates the tendency to behave in terms of one's group membership, albeit that the way this is expressed can be constrained by social reality, as we have seen above.
An important aim of the present study was to disentangle the three components of social identity, as well as the role they play as mediators of social behaviour. In line with our analysis based on original formulations of social identity theory, group commitment appears to be the key aspect of social identity which drives the tendency for people to behave in terms of their group membership. Furthermore, we established that, compared to an assigned group aliation, people tend to feel more committed to self-selected (or achieved) group memberships, and this dierential group commitment emerges relatively independently of other group features, such as its relative status. As far as we know, the present study is the ®rst in which this dierence between assigned versus self-selected group memberships is studied experimentally. Indeed, although we would argue that processes similar to those observed here may be responsible for previously documented dierences in responses between members of natural and arti®cially created social groups, this has so far not been systematically established. Consequently, we feel that future research should be sensitive to possible eects of such features of social groups. More generally, the results of the present study underline that, in order to understand the psychological processes involved, it is essential to aim for more conceptual precision in theory and research on intergroup relations.
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